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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL

PROCEDURE-ENVIRONMENTAL

CLASS

ACTIONS:

ECONONIC

23 NONAGGREGATION DOcmNEZahn v. InternationalPaperCo., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
RAMIFICATIONS

OF

THE RULE

Four individual owners of property fronting on Vermont's Lake
Champlain commenced a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) 1 in federal district court on behalf of themselves
and some 200 similarly situated lakefront property owners and lessees.
The plaintiffs, basing federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship,
sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages of $40,000,000
for the impairment of their property rights caused by the defendant's alleged pollution of the lake's waters. 2 The claim of each of the four
named plaintiffs was found to independently satisfy the jurisdictional

amount requirement of $10,000, but the district court was convinced "to a legal certainty" that not every individual owner or les3
see in the class had suffered pollution damages in excess of $10,000.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in part:
(a) Prerequisitesto a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: . . .
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
2. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant International Paper Company permitted discharges of untreated or inadequately treated waste from its pulp and paper plant in
the Village of Ticonderoga to flow into Ticonderoga Creek and then into the lake.
The pollutants created a massive sludge blanket on the bottom of the lake; masses of
sludge apparently separated from the bottom periodically and were deposited on
appellants' property. As a consequence, appellants alleged diminution in the value
and utility of their own property as well as the surrounding properties. 414 U.S. at 292.
3. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971), quoting
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). In St.
Paul Mercury Indemnity, the Supreme Court stated:
The rule goveruning dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the
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The district court, reading Snyder v. Harris4 as precluding maintenance of an action by any member of the class whose "separate and
distinct" claim did not individually satisfy the federal jurisdictional
amount requirement, 5 refused to allow the suit to proceed as a class
action on the ground that it would not be feasible to define a class
6
of property owners each of whom had more than a $10,000 claim.
A divided court of appeals affirmed. 7 On certiorari to the Supreme
Court, held: Affirmed. Where the rights asserted are separate and
distinct, all members of the proposed class, both named and unnamed, must individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
This note will examine the impact of Zahn v. InternationalPaper
Co. within the context of environmental litigation. It will briefly
trace the history of the nonaggregation doctrine relied upon and reaffirmed by the Zahn majority, and describe the limitations imposed
upon would-be federal plaintiffs by that doctrine. The note then will
examine various alternative modes of adjudication, including the ancillary jurisdiction alternative suggested by dissenting Justice Brennan,
which would have been preferable to the position adopted by the majority. Finally, and most importantly, the note will take a hard look at
the deleterious economic effects of Zahn upon environmental plaintiffs, concluding that the inevitability of these economic effects justifies a result other than that reached by the Court.

federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the
plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear
to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount
to justify dismissal.
Id. at 288-9.
4. 394 U.S. 332(1969).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 10,000. exclusive of interest and costs, and is between( 1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
6. Judge Leddy, in the district court opinion, concluded by stating:
We reach our decision today with great reluctance. . . . [T] he requirement that
each class member meet the jurisdictional amount clearly undermines the usefulness of Rule 23(b)(3) class suits, because the problem of defining an appropriate class over which the court has jurisdiction will often prove insuperable.
53 F.R.D. at 433.
7. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
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I.

CLASS ACTIONS AND THE
NONAGGREGATION DOCTRINE

The availability of the aggregation doctrine as a mechanism to recognize federal claims which do not independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement has traditionally turned upon whether the
rights asserted by the plaintiffs were characterized as "separate and
distinct," or "common and undivided."' 8 This distinction led to the
general rule, as set forth in Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co.:9
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands,
unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that
the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when
several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right, in which they
have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their interests
collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.
The rule that separate and distinct claims may not be aggregated to
invoke federal jurisdiction is dictated neither by the language nor the
legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and its predecessors. 10 Rather,
8. Judicial decisions considering aggregation of claims can be traced back to 1832
when the Supreme Court in Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832), held
that the statutory phrase "matter in dispute" did not permit the aggregation of "separate and distinct" claims in order to invoke the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The
Alexander rule, which was extended to federal trial court jurisdiction in Walter v.
Northeastern R.R., 147 U.S. 370 (1893), was supplemented by Shields v. Thomas,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 3 (1854), in which the Court held that where the plaintiffs establish the existence of a "common and undivided" interest in the recovery, aggregation
of claims is proper.
The Congress has historically required that a jurisdictional minimum be established
as a prerequisite to the initiation of a federal diversity suit. Section 11 of the first
Judiciary Act of 1789 set the jurisdictional amount in diversity suits at $500. Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. In 1801, Congress lowered the requirement to
$400 in The Law of the Midnight Judges, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 13, 2 Stat.
92, but it was quickly restored to $500 the following year. Act of March 8, 1802, ch.
8, § 3, 2 Stat. 132. The jurisdictional amount requirement remained fixed at this level
until the Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, when it was increased
to $2000. The figure was increased by $1000 by the Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 2,
§ 24, 36 Stat. 1091. 45 CONG. REC. 3596-99 (Mar. 23, 1910); 46 CONG. REc. 400204 (Mar. 2, 1911). This history was recited by the majority in Zahn. 414 U.S. at
293 n.l.
The current $ 10,000 jurisdictional amount, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970),
was enacted by Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1 (July 25, 1958).
9. 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911), cited in Zahn, 414 U.S. at 294. See also Clay v.
Field, 138 U.S. 464, 479 (1891).
10. The statutory language makes no mention of "separate" or "distinct." Comment, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1554, 1568 (1968).
Congress, when reenacting the jurisdictional statutes, did not add such language nor
change the original phraseology. Id. It has been suggested, however, that Congress
acquiesced in the judicial construction, and that "separate" and "distinct" was incorporated by silence. Gibson v. Shufeldf, 122 U.S. 27, 40 (1887).
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it derives from the collective interests of Congress and the federal judiciary in precluding "petty controversies" from gaining a federal
forum" and in preserving the independent authority of the state
courts.' 2 Accordingly, federal courts, where separate and distinct
claims are present, have held that convenience of the parties is not a
suitable basis for jurisdiction.1:3
The 1966 amendment to Federal Rule of Procedure 23 replaced
the original tripartite analysis 14 of the Rule with a "functional" apII. The only recent suggestion of congressional purpose is the often repeated
statement in the legislative history of the 1958 amendments:
The recommendations of the Judicial Conference [of the United States] regarding the amount in controversy, which this committee approves, is based on the
premise that the amount should be fixed at a sum of money that will make jurisdiction available in all substantial controversies where other elements of federal
jurisdiction are present. The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to
convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter
away their time in the trial of petty controversies.
S. Ri-P. No. 1830. 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958) (emphasis added): H R. RFrP. No.
1706, 85th Cong.. 2d Sess. 3 (1958) (containing identical language).
12. An underlying premise of the decision in Snyder v.Harris is a recognition of
the sovereignty of the states in the federal system and the independence of the states'
judicial authority. The Court in Snyder expressed a fear that to allow aggregation of
claims under the circumstances of that case might result in many local controversies.
involving exclusively questions of state law. being transferred into federal courts. 394
U.S. 332. 340 (1969): see Healy v. Ratta. 292 U.S. 263. 270 (1934).
13. When parties, for their own convenience, join actions that could be litigated
separately. the court would be disregarding the strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) if it
accepted jurisdiction over the combined actions when such jurisdiction would be lacking over the actions separately. Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464 (1891). On the other
hand, when the interest is a common and undivided one, and when the interests of
one party cannot be determined without directly affecting the rights of others, then
it can be said that the matter in controversy consists of the combined financial interests of all of the plaintiffs. Thus, in effect, aggregation is permitted only in cases of
compulsory joinder and the parties' convenience is not a factor. In Pinel v. Pinel. 240
U.S. 594, 596 (1916), the Court said: -'[W] hen two or more plaintiffs having separate and distinct demands unite in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each
be of the requisite jurisdictional amount.
...
See also Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co.. 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911): Walter v. Northeastern R.R.. 147 U.S. 370.
373 (1893). See generally, Comment, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions.
68 Cot NI. I. Rt v. 1554. 1556 & 1559(1968).
14. The original Rule 23(a) divided class actions into three categories according
to whether the rights of the class were (I) joint and common. (2) several, but affecting the same specific property, or (3) several, but having common factual or legal
questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 308 U.S. 689 (1939). These relationships came to be
known as 'true," "'hybrid" and "'spurious" class actions respectively. The tripartite
approach taken by the original class action rule made a basic distinction between a
-joint" right and those rights that were to be considered "several. This distinction
permitted consistent application of the Troy Bank aggregation rules in class suits
The aggregation of claims in class actions was permitted only in true class actions:
i.e., where the rights of the class members were joint, common and undivided. Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp.. 81 F. Supp. 957. 961 (D. Del. 1949). In hybrid and
spurious actions, where the rights asserted were several, the claim of each named
party of record had to meet the required jurisdictional amount to avoid dismissal.
Hackner v. Guaranty Trust of New York. 117 F.2d 95.98 (2d Cir. 1941).
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proach to the maintenance of class actions. 15 The amended Rule 23
permits maintenance of a class action upon a finding of: undue risk, to
either party, of separate adjudications; the appropriateness of class
injunctive or declaratory relief; or the predominance of common
questions of law or fact in the action.1 6 With the change in the categories of Rule 23, many commentators had hoped that the adoption of
the new Rule 23 would result in a new approach to the treatment of
the aggregation question in class actions.17 However, the Court in
8 asserted that the nonaggregation doctrine was not
Snyder v. Harris1
based upon the categories of the old Rule 23 or upon any rule of procedure, but rather upon judicial interpretation of the statutory phrase
"matter in controversy."' 9 The Snyder Court then held that where
none of the plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action allege damages in
excess of $10,000, their separate and distinct claims may not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).
In Zahn, Mr. Justice White, writing for a majority of six, recognized the historic dichotomy between interests of plaintiffs which are
"common and undivided" and those which can be termed "separate
and distinct," and invoked the "well established" rule that where multiple plaintiffs assert separate and distinct claims, "[e] ach . .. must
satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must
be dismissed from the case .... -20 The Zahn Court thus extended
the Snyder nonaggregation principle to require that any plaintiff with
a claim of less than the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed, even
21
where the named plaintiffs allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims.
The extension of Snyder was premised on the notion that, among
individuals related only by common questions of law and fact, juris15.

See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969). See also 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
[hereinafter cited

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1753, at 538 (1972)
as WRIGHT & MILLER].

16. For discussion of the new categories, see J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.30.45 (1969).
17. See, e.g., Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of
Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 601 (1969); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 399-400 (1967), Note, 43 TUL. L. REV. 360
(1969); Note, 52 MINN. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1967). But see Note, Aggregation of
Claims in Class Actions, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1554 (1968).
18. 394 U.S. 332(1969).
19. Id. at 336.
20. 414 U.S. 291,301 (1973).
21. 414 U.S. at 300.
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diction should not attach for those without claims of the requisite
22
amount merely "by adding a plaintiff who can show jurisdiction.."
Despite the historical and doctrinal legitimacy of the nonaggregation decision in Zahn, the Court's extension of Snyder significantly
reduces the utility of the class mechanism and frustrates its three-fold
purpose: (1) to take "care of the smaller guy" whose claim is less than
the costs of enforcing it;23 (2) to promote judicial efficiency and
comity;2 4 and (3) to deter antisocial conduct by those who-absent
the class device-might never be required to account for their conduct.2 5 By redefining the scope of the class to include only those plaintiffs who can independently establish damages of the jurisdictionally
required amount, the Court requires delineation of class on the basis
of the dollar amount of each claim, rather than utilization of the
modern Rule 23 functional approach which seeks to define the class
on the basis of the nature of the claim asserted.26 The extension of
Snyder has not only adversely affected the traditional purpose of the
class action but, as will be discussed, has also frustrated Rule 23's
unique function within the context of environmental litigation.

22. 414 U.S. at 297. citing Hackner v. Guaranty Trust. 117 F.2d 95. 98 (2d
(Cir. 1941). It should be noted that the decision in Hackner was written by Judge

Clark who is the "principal architect" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
decision was influential by reason of Judge Clark's analysis of Rule 23 in light of the
established case law interpreting the "'matter in controversy" clause.
The legal basis for the extension was the Court's earlier decision. to like
effect. in Clark v. Paul Gray. Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). and Snyder's approval
of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co.. 375
l-.2d 992

5th Cir.

1967). cert. denied, 389 U.S.

827

11967). Alvarez was de-

cided after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 and involved a class action with
only one member of the class having a claim sufficient to satisfy § 1332.
23.
See Ford. Federal Rale 23: A
B.C. IND. & COIM. L. Ri-v. 501 (1969).

24.

Device for Aiding the Small Claimant.

10

Advisory C'omm.'s Note on Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 39 F.R.D 98.

102 03 (1966): Kaplan. Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendmentsi of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1).81 HRV. L. Riv. 356. 390
(1967). See also NIungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry.. 318 F. Snpp. 720. 730 (M D. Fla.

1970). affd, 441 F.2d 728 5th Cir. 1971).
25.
Weinstein. Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BtFi.
1.. R iv. 433. 437 (1960).

26.
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II.

ALTERNATIVE MODES OF
ADJUDICATION

A.

Ancillary Jurisdiction

Justice Brennan, dissenting in Zahn, recognized the principle that
separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated to invoke the
district court's jurisdiction, but argued that '"
[o] nce jurisdiction has
attached to the 'action' . . . the 'aggregation' rule has been but one of
several ways to establish jurisdiction over additional claims and parties."'27 Since each of the four named plaintiffs in Zahn asserted jurisdictionally sufficient claims, Justice Brennan contended that jurisdiction had been established over the "action" and that the Court should
invoke "ancillary jurisdiction" 28 to recognize the claims of unnamed
class plaintiffs who could not independently satisfy the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 29 Justice Brennan suggested that by allowing
the plaintiffs to proceed as a class, ,the Court could have effectuated
both the economic and procedural purposes of class action litigation
without seriously frustrating enforcement of the jurisdictional amount
30
requirement.
Ancillary jurisdiction was originally invoked only when necessary
to dispose effectively of all claims to specific property before the

27. 414U.S.at305.
28. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is premised on this notion:
[A] district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an entirety,
and may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly before it, possess
jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not take
cognizance were they independently presented.
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19 (2d ed. 1970)
(emphasis added). An ancillary claim may be considered without regard to the citizenship of the parties, amount in controversy or any other factor generally determinative of the court's jurisdiction. The ancillary power has been exercised to take
cognizance of jurisdictionally-deficient, compulsory counterclaims, cross claims, impleader of third party defendants, interpleader and intervention as of right. 414
U.S. at 306.
29. 414 U.S. at 306.
30. The concern for overworking the federal judiciary would be overcome because ancillary jurisdiction requires that there be a party who has independently invoked the court's jurisdiction. Since the court's jurisdiction has already been established
the court is required to hear the action. Only if the class were so large and cumbersome as to be unmanageable could it be said that unnecessary additional burdens
were being placed on the court. This situation would effectively be remedied by Rule
23(b)(3), which requires that a class action be superior to other methods "for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy .. ." See also Advisory Comm.'s
Note, sitpra note 24, at 103; Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D.
Minn. 1968).
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court.:" Although the concept was employed in other limited contexts, 32 its early application was only as a necessary adjunct to the
effective exercise of a court's primary jurisdiction.3 3 The Court in
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange:14 provided the foundation for expansion of ancillary jurisdiction by recognizing a defendant's counterclaim, even though it lacked an independent jurisdictional basis, where
the counterclaim arose from the same "transaction" or "'series of...
occurrences" as the plaintiffs jurisdiction-conferring claim. Such ex35
tensions of ancillary jurisdiction are premised upon a desire:
to effectuate judicial economy and efficiency, to prevent piecemeal litigation of connected claims which would otherwise result from the
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, [and] . . . most importantly, to render more complete justice and convenience to litigants.
Development of the ancillary concept has also been influenced by
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,: 6 whereby original federal jurisdiction is, in certain specified circumstances, extended to nonfederal
claims. In United Mine Worker v. Gibbs,3 7 the Supreme Court held

31.

Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450t1861).
HANDBOOK OF IlIII,W or Fi )LRAI CotURrS § 9. at 20 (2d
ed. 1970).
33. When federal court jurisdiction had been properly exercised, a court would
extend this jurisdiction to other parties and claims if necessary to implement its
judgment. See, e.g., Cincinnati. I. & W. R.R. v. Indianapolis Union Ry.. 270 U.S. 107
(1926): Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble. 255 U.S. 356 (1921): Root v. Woolworth. 15O U.S. 401 (1893): Pacific R.R. v. Missouri P. Ry.. I ll U.S. 505 11884).
34. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). In Moore plaintiff sued defendant under the antitrust
laws for withholding cotton quotations. and asked for an injunction to compel the
defendant to furnish them. Defendant counterclaimed to enjoin plaintiff from purloining the quotations. The Supreme Court held that both claims arose out of the same
subject matter because essential facts alleged by the plaintiff constituted part of the
cause of action set forth in the counterclaim, although the counterclaim also embraced additional allegations. See Fraser. Ancillars, Jurisdiction and The Joinder of
Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963).
35. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 348 (D. Minn. 1967). See also 7
WRIwtl & MNIitLR § 1659. at 313; Walmac Co., Inc. v. lsaacs. 220 F.2d 108. 113
lstCir. 1955): Childress v. Cook. 245 F.2d 798. 805 (5th Cir. 1957),
36. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has traditionally been invoked only
where a plaintiff seeks to annex a state law claim to his federal question claim and
assert both against a nondiverse defendant. Ancillary jurisdiction generally involves
the joinder of additional parties to an existing controversy or assertion of new claims
by existing parties. 7 WRIGHt & MILLER § 1659. at 314. With the recent growth of
pendent party jurisdiction, the two concepts are becoming increasingly similar in nature. See Comment. Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 73 CoLUI. L. RE)".
153. 164-65(1973).
37. 383 U.S. 715 1966).
32.
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that federal judicial power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's state law claim exists where the primary federal question
independently satisfies the jurisdictional requirements and is "substantial," and where both claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" constituting one "constitutional case."' 38 Implicit in the
Court's reasoning was the notion that the federal question statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1331, carries with it the constitutional authorization of pendent power. 39 A similar power base has been recognized in actions
40
dealing specifically with ancillary jurisdiction.
Although Gibbs did not involve joinder of new parties, recent federal courts of appeals decisions have recognized the existence of judicial power to hear pendent claims involving pendent parties, i.e.,
claims of an additional plaintiff against an original defendant, or
claims by an original plaintiff against a new defendant, where the entire action before the court comprises but one "constitutional case" as
defined by Gibbs.4 1 Where jurisdiction is based upon diversity, joinder
of parties with claims below $10,000 has generally been allowed if the
claims of the parties seeking to join are sufficiently related to those of

38. 383 U.S. at 725. The boundaries of the "common nucleus of operative fact" test
are not precise, but claims arising out of the same accident or personal injury have
been aggregated and recognized even though they individually lacked an independent
jurisdictional basis. See, e.g., Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. N.Y.
1970); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Newman
v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
39. Note, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 991, 997 (1973). However, the constitutional grant
of judicial power in art. III, § 2 is not self-executing and the Gibbs Court did not
explain precisely how the pendent power was transmitted to the district courts.
40. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d
709, 714 (5th Cir. 1970) (ancillary jurisdiction over a state law claim of a nondiverse plaintiff found so long as that claim "bears a logical relationship to the aggregate
core of operative facts" which constitutes the primary jurisdiction-enforcing claim);
Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959) ("aggregate of operative facts").
41. See, e.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083-85 (2d Cir. 1971) cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800,
809-10 (2d Cir. 1971); F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d
917, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1970); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 81617 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City
Hospital, 392 F.2d 149, 153-54 (3rd Cir. 1968). While Gibbs did not involve pendent party claims, judicial extension has been undertaken in light of dictum that joinder of parties is to be encouraged: "Joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged." 383 U.S. at 724 (emphasis added). See generally Comment, Federal
Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction--The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs
Extended to Persons Not Party to the Jurisdiction Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 153 (1973).

151

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 143, 1974

plaintiffs properly before the court. 42 Similar results have been
reached in cases involving federal question jurisdiction. In Almenares
v. Wyman, 43 the Second Circuit appended a Rule 23(b)(2) class suit
to a jurisdictionally sufficient federal claim and allowed the action to
proceed even though the subject class had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. While limiting its holding to
pendent class actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, the court
clearly recognized the power to join additional plaintiffs and, in addition, found no inherent limitation in Rule 23 which would per se pre44
clude recognition of a pendent class claim.

In addition to the Almenares recognition of a pendent class injunctive suit, it has been held that the court has the power to append a
class suit for damages to an injunctive action which independently satisfies the jurisdictional requirement. In Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 45

plaintiffs instituted a class action seeking damages and injunctive
relief to abate air pollution created by the railroad's coal storage and
shipping facilities. The court, relying on Snyder v. Harris,stated that
aggregation of claims for damages alone was improper to provide the
necessary jurisdiction. 46 The court recognized that there were two distinct and separate class actions involved, one for damages and one for
injunction; it then determined that the claim for injunctive relief,
which satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirements, was the "first
42. See, e.g., Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n. 431 F.2d 1122. 1128 (6th Cir.
1970) (actions against insurers with less than S10.000 potential liability joined with
actions against insurers with more than S10.000 liability): Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co.. 415 F.2d 809. 816 (8th Cir. 1969) (district court jurisdiction extended to
party claiming only $9,999 when the underlying cause was removed from state court):
Stone v. Stone. 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968) (diversity action for less than S10.000 pendent to diversity action for more than jurisdictional amount against different party):
Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital. 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) (claim against hospital. limited by statute to less than S10.000. pendent to action against physician).
43. 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972). Plaintiff
Almenares and others sued the Commissioner of Social Services of New York City
for restoration of welfare payments. claiming that the termination procedure violated
due process of law. The primary action established subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Almenares also sought an injunction against the state
Commissioner of Social Services for the class of welfare recipients in the state. None
of the class members could independently establish damages in excess of S 10.000.
44. 453 F.2d at 1084. Other courts have followed the example of Alnenares in
exercising pendent jurisdiction over a class action. See Serritella v. Engelman. 339
F. Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 1972): Fischer v. Weaver. 55 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. II1. 1972).
45. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
46. Id. at 355.
47. Id. The requisite jurisdictional amount existed for this action by virtue of a
liberal evaluation of the right to live in a clean environment and the application of the
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and principal action. '4 7 Noting that the same evidence would be presented for the damage claims as for the equitable claim already properly before the court-in effect, stating that the claims derived from
"a common nucleus of operative fact"-the court concluded that "in
the interest of judicial efficiency, [it] will assume jurisdiction over the
entire controversy. '48 Thus, Biechele represents an application of ancillary jurisdiction, in a manner consistent with the Gibbs test, in
order to adjudicate a class claim in its entirety.
The individual claims of the class members in Zahn derived from a
"common nucleus of operative fact, '49 thereby permitting, under the
reasoning of Gibbs, the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. This reasoning was employed in Lesch v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 5o a Rule
23(b)(3) class action in which two of three named plaintiffs failed to
independently establish the jurisdictional amount. The Lesch court
held that where at least one representative had established damages in
excess of $10,000, and where members of the class having smaller
claims were originally named parties, the class action could proceed
as constituted. 5 1 Application of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to
class actions has also been exercised in cases where the unnamed parties of a class action do not satisfy the rule of complete diversity. In
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,5 2 the Supreme Court held that
only the originally-named plaintiffs and defendants had to satisfy
the diversity requirements and that intervention by nondiverse parties would not destroy the district court's jurisdiction.
Even though the claims of the pendent or ancillary parties may derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact," the Court in Gibbs
distinguished the power to exercise such jurisdiction from the dis-

defendant's viewpoint to determine "matter in controversy." For discussion of the
defendant viewpoint test, see Comment, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregation of Claims:
The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE L.J. 1577 (1970), and notes 68-69 & accompanying text infra.
48. 309 F. Supp. at 355.
49. The damages claimed by all parties in Zahn resulted from one source-the
activities of defendant International Paper Company. See note 2 supra. The activities

of the defendant constitute a "common nucleus of operative facts."
50. 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. I11. 1968). Lesch was a pre-Snyder case which presented factual considerations identical to Zahn. It would appear that the decision
in Zahn overrules Lesch sub silentio. The majority in Zahn neither discussed nor
attempted to distinguish Lesch in any manner.
51. Id. at 912.
52. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). Justice Brennan emphasized this point in his dissent in
Zahn. 414 U.S. at 309.
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cretionary use of that power.5 3 Dismissal of a pendent claim is
presumptively required unless the court is convinced that retention
would result in substantial "economy, fairness and convenience to
litigants." 54 The federal courts have wisely exercised this discretionary power to further federal policy in areas of special concern, 55 while seeking to maintain comity between the federal and
state courts. 5
Discretionary exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of
environmental class actions would promote the substantial federal interest in environmental quality5 7 by facilitating proper judicial consid53. 383 U.S. at 727. Fhis distinction had been recognized by many lower courts.
See, e.g., Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co.. 183 F.2d
497, 501 (lst Cir. l950), Strachman v. Palmer. 177 F.2d 427. 431 (ist Cir. 1949)
(Magruder. C. J.. concurring): Walters v. Shari Music Publishing Corp.. 193 F. Supp.
307 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). appeal dismissed conditionally, 298 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1962).
See also 383 U.S. at 727. where it is suggested that the existence of power to hear
pendent claims will normally be determined on the basis of the pleadings. because a
motion to strike the state claims from the complaint will generally be made. Whether to exercise discretion, however, might not be determined until the trial court is
more familiar with the basic facts and the nature of the probable proofs. See Note.
The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 62 (oiL M. L. Ri',. 1018. 1047 (1962) (decision should await disposition of
federal claim). See also Note. UMW r. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HXR\.
L. Ri-v. 657. 659 60(1968).
54. Id. at 726. The Court might have established a presumption in favor of retention: once power was established, dismissal would be required only when a court
was convinced that economy, convenience or fairness would not be served. This vie\%
has been adopted by the American Law Institute. but the existence of power is limited to cases where a "substantial question of fact is common" to both claims. See
ALI Siur)

"o

I l

Div. oi- JURiSDI(Tio-, BiL]XViEN SlATE & FED. COURTS § 1313(a.

Comment at 120 22 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1967).
i5. Sherrod v. Pink Hat Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965) (pendent
state claim allowed in action initiated pursuant to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964). The power has also been exercised to insure effective remedies for federal
rights, see Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966). and to define
the permissible limits of state intrusion into federal spheres of concern. Wilson H
Lee Co. v. New Haven Printing Pressmen Local 74. 255 F. Supp. 929 (D. Conn.
1966). See also Note. UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv L. Ri s.
657. 667- 70 (1968).
56. In Moor v. County of Alameda. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). the Supreme Court
stated that, assuming. arguendo, the district court had judicial power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the petitioners" state law claims, the court did not abuse its
discretion in not exercising that power in view of unsettled questions of state law.
See also Rundle v. Madigan. 331 F. Supp. 492. 495 n. 5 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The Court
in Moor also stated that the likelihood of jury confusion was an appropriate factor
to consider. 4 11 U.S. at 716.
For discussion of federal-state comity. see Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HsRV. IL.Ri','. 657. 665 67)1968).
57. The federal interest in environmental quality is expressly set forth in § 101 of
the National Environmental Policy Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). which provides.
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment:
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eration of the full range of problems and potential remedies. Moreover, such exercise would minimize the presence of piecemeal litigation
and the production of diverse, and perhaps inconsistent, judicial solutions and patchwork remedies,5 8 all of which have undesirable economic consequences. 59 In light of Gibbs, Biechele, Lesch and Cauble,
and the time-honored recognition of ancillary power, the discretionary
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, as urged by Justice Brennan, would
have been most appropriate in Zahn.
B.

ParensPatriae

State government bodies can participate in the enforcement of individual rights asserted by citizens of the state under the doctrine of
parens patriae.60 To proceed under the doctrine, the state must independently assert a claim of the requisite amount to invoke federal jurisdiction.6 1 It has been suggested that citizens having small claims for
environmental injury could circumvent Snyder and Zahn by transferring their claims to the state attorney general. 62 Although this proceto promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
This federal interest is further evidenced by the enactment of significant environmental measures such as the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq. (1970);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970);
Federal Dept. of Trans. Act. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970); Coastal Zone Mgm't Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. III, 1973).
58. While each court handling a portion of an environmental problem might handle that portion in an efficient manner, there is no guarantee that the aggregate effect of the individual adjudications will result in an optimal or consistent solution to
the problem as a whole.
59. See section III infra.
60. See generally Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Note, State
Protection of Its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6
COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROB. 411 (1970); Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The
Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under The Antitrust Laws, 43
S. CAL. L. REV.570 (1970).
61. There are two basic jurisdictional requirements which must be satisfied for a
suit in parens patriae: The state must have some interest apart from the individual
citizens, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1922), and it must be acting
to protect a "substantial" portion of its populace. Id.; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
301 F. Supp. 982, 986 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th
Cir. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); accord, Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 28
(1900).
62. Comment, The Federal Class Action in Environmental Litigation: Problems
and Possibilities, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 1385, 1402 (1973). This suggestion is based upon
the commentator's interpretation of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1971), wherein the court apparently approved an assignment of claims.
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dure would prevent individual recovery by the citizens, it would serve
the societal interests in cost internalization and deterrence.
However, the viability of the parens patriae suit as an alternative to
Zahn is uncertain. While governmental bodies have long had standing
to sue for injunctive relief to preserve access to natural resources6
and to preserve the health and comfort of their citizens,"4 they have
not been permitted to recover damages in compensation for the injuries suffered by their citizens.65 Thus, the action would be primarily
limited to injunctive relief and subject to the same economic criticisms
as other injunctive remedies.""1
C.

Injunctive Relief

Both Snyder and Zahn were class actions commenced pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(3) in which the plaintiffs sought damages for impairment
of separate and distinct rights. The inhibiting impact of these decisions upon subsequent environmental litigation may be mitigated by
utilization of injunctive or declaratory procedures. Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class action when the party opposing the class has acted, or
refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class. The rule is
expressly limited to cases in which 'final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole" will
7
be appropriate."
The establishment of jurisdiction in a class injunctive suit will deThis approach is uncertain, however, in light of Kramer v. Caribbean Mills. Inc.. 394
U.S. 823 (1969). which stated that assignments to create federal jurisdiction .ill
not be recognized.
63. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia. 262 U.S. 553 (1922) (suit to enjoin a plan
which would have foreclosed substantial natural gas reserves from use).
64. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208. 241 (1901) (suit to enjoin discharge of
sewage).
6i. The court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.. 301 -. Supp. 982. 986 (D. Hawaii
1969). rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 19th Cir. 1970). af.d. 405 U.S. 251
(1972). stated:
IT) he state's parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover damages on behalf of the state's individual citizen-claimants. it is not a substitute for
a class action under Rule 23 .
Accord, In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D, 398. 401
((.D. Cal. 1970).
66. See text accompanying notes 73 & 74 infia.
67. Fi). R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) provides:
An action is maintainable as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
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pend upon the court's valuation of the relief sought 68 and the characterization of the rights asserted. Courts in various nondamage suits
have allowed the plaintiff to measure the amount in controversy from
the defendant's point of view rather than from his own.6 9 Even if the
courts were to reject the "defendant's viewpoint" test, it is probable
that when environmental interests are asserted by the class in an injunctive action, such interests will be characterized as "common and
undivided" and therefore appropriate for aggregation.7 0 This characterization of the interest asserted by plaintiff was implied in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee,7 1 in which the Supreme Court disposed of the
valuation problem summarily by stating that the "considerable interests
involved in the purity of interstate waters would seem to put beyond
question the jurisdictional amount .... ,,72
The class injunctive solution to environmental controversies represents a shift from the decentralized decision-making process, associated with the individual damage remedy, to a centralized judicial
planning process. 73 Use of the injunction compels the federal judiciary, rather than private market mechanisms, to make environmental
protection and resource allocation decisions. However, while injuncapplicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ....
68. Traditionally, there have been two possible ways to measure the amount in
controversy: (1) the plaintiff's viewpoint, or (2) the defendant's viewpoint. Most
cases, and all those cases in which individual plaintiffs allege separate and distinct
claims for damages, have applied the plaintiffs viewpoint. See Strausberg, Class Actions and the JurisdictionalAmount: Access to a Federal Forum--A Post Snyder v.
Harris Analysis, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 79, 102-09 (1972); Comment, Taxpayer Suits
and the Aggregation of Clanis: The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE LJ. 1577
(1970).
69. See, e.g., Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971)
(alternate holding). See also Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Wis.
1969). Although this interpretation is not uniformly applied, several recent environmental class suits have indicated that the jurisdictional amount is to be measured by
the "pecuniary results to the defendants" which would occur from the relief requested by the plaintiffs. See James River and Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 5 ENVIRON. RPTR. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Va. 1973); Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969). Comment, Amount
in Controversy in Suits for Nonmonetary Remedies, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (1958).
70. The court in Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F.
Supp. 696, 704 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), held that where an injuction is sought, the $10,000
jurisdictional amount may be determined by the value of the project sought to be
enjoined or "the quantified costs from new pollution" rather than the value of injunctive relief to each individual member of the class.
71. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The case involved a non-class action to abate a public
nuisance arising from the alleged dumping of raw sewage into Lake Michigan.
72. Id. at 98.
73. See generally Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-accidental Perspective
on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE LJ. 647 (1971). A centralized decision making pro-
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tion actions have the advantage of reducing costs to the individual litigants and providing a viable mechanism for technological assessment.
they are inefficient by themselves. Serious economic and social distortions may result from: (1) the substantial cost and time required by
the federal judiciary to define the environmental problem and determine appropriate relief; (2) the limitation of relief to abatement
only;7 4 (3) the inefficiencies inherent in centralized decision making; 7; and (4) the difficulty in valuing both private and societal
7
costs as presented in an injunctive suit. 1
Thus, although utilization of parens patriae and class injunctive
actions may in certain instances open the door of environmental liticration closed so firmly by Zahn, the ancillary jurisdiction alternative
is much more attractive because it encompasses the full range of possible legal actions. As will be discussed below, the peculiar economics
of activities affecting the environment mandate use of the private class
action for damages as a principal legal mechanism. The discretionary
exercise of ancillary power, properly accounting for the unique character of environmental problems, is the most practical and doctrinally
sound method by which to recognize and delimit environmental class
actions for damages.
II.

THE ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTIONS
The environmental class action has the potential of providing a

cess will result because the court will be required to provide a pervasive plan to deal
with an environmental problem. The court will no longer be aided by a decentralized process-i.e., damage awards which will become a part of private cost-benefit
decisionsm-in the allocation of resources and solution to environmental controversies. A decentralized system would bring private market factors to bear since the cost
would be internalized to the producer of the pollution and his production would be
adjusted in accordance with the costs associated with alternative courses of action.
74. Imposition of an injunction which could be lifted upon the agreement of
the parties involved could be utilized to incorporate the private market into the judicial solution. The plaintiffs could then bargain with the polluter for an amount representing the economic value of the injunction to them.
75. Centralized judicial decision-making may prove to be inefficient because the
courts are not equipped to fully and adequately evaluate all the economic, scientific
and technological data essential to the complex solution. While courts have the
capacity. e.g., by utilization of special masters, to consider such factors, it is important to note that such an analysis would require the development of a complete
environmental plan for an area. The courts' limited expertise and resources would be
especially taxed in injunctive actions.
76. SeealsoSierraClub v. Froelke. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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mechanism by which the judiciary may fully consider the societal
costs and benefits emanating from particular activities and thereby
resolve environmental controversies in a manner which promotes ecohomic efficiency and optimal allocation of natural resources. 7 7 Environmental problems such as pollution, being peculiarly group problems resulting from deficiencies in the market-pricing mechanism,
require the judiciary to respond in a manner which recognizes both
the group and economic character of the problem. Thus, judicial resolution of any environmental question must be premised upon consideration of the group affected by a particular activity and the economic
aspects of the controversy. A failure to fully and adequately deal with
these factors will result in continued economic inefficiencies and pollution.
A.

Economic Considerationsin PollutionControl

The degree of pollution present in our society is in large part due to
a failure of the market-pricing mechanisms to accurately reflect the
true cost to society of producing a particular product.78 Traditionally,
the market system controls private production by informing the entrepreneur of the anticipated costs to him of a specific activity. The entrepreneur will respond to these "private" costs and will increase production until he reaches the optimal level of output.7 9 But cases arise,
as in the case of pollution, in which the producer's "private" costs do
not include all the costs of his decision; i.e., some costs are imposed
upon people who do not make the business decision. To the extent
that the costs to society, produced by the polluting activity, remain
"external" to the private decision-maker, society will witness an excessive amount of pollution and an inefficient allocation of resources.
These distortions in the price mechanism are known as "externalities."'8 0 In order to insure an efficient allocation of resources and
77.

See generally Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21

STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cost-Internalization].

78.

Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1(1960).

79. Each profit maximizing entrepreneur considers his opportunity costs when
considering a course of action. If the marginal benefit (revenue for the business) exceeds marginal costs, the action will be profitable and will be undertaken. If the marginal cost includes all the costs which result from the action, the profit seeking de-

cision will result in resources being used most efficiently.
80.

Cost-Internalization, supra note 77, at 383. Technically, the term external-

ity refers to any benefit or cost which is created by a particular activity but which
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minimum level of pollution, it is necessary that the external costs of a
given activity be effectively "internalized."
The legal system hinders cost internalization by failing to adequately define property rights in such resources as the atmosphere and
water. Nonproducers burdened by external costs are unable to assert
property rights so as to receive compensation for invasion of those
rights. Even if property rights were adequately defined, costs may
remain external because of the traditional undervaluation of aesthetic
and recreational interests in the environment. 8 ' While it is recognized
that valuation problems exist, 82 to deny any consideration of environmental interests leads to greater economic inefficiencies and inequities
than to attempt some, albeit inaccurate, valuation. It is necessary to
attempt to value legally cognizable interests in environmental quality
in order to approach an economically efficient solution.sa
B.

Cost Internalization Via Legal Processes

One of the functions of a legal system should be to ensure that the
external costs and benefits of a particular activity do not remain external to the person or enterprise generating such diseconomies.8 4 Indoes not become a part of the private cost-benefit calculation of the producer. Thus.
as its name suggests, it remains external to the private decision making process.
In Zahn an external diseconomy resulted from the fact that the pollution of Lake
Champlain imposed costs upon society in general. and upon members of the class in
particular, in terms of decreased recreational and property values. Therefore. the
social cost of producing paper (social cost equals private costs plus external costs)
exceeded the private cost and an overproduction of paper resulted because the producer's private cost understated the true cost to society of producing the good.
See also Baxter. The SST: Fron Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. R~v.
1.39 (1968): A. Pigou. The Economics of Welfare (4th ed. 1932).
81. See generally Note. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental
PolicV Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1092 (1972).
82. Attempts at evaluating the "'cost" of pollution have met with mixed sentiments. See, e.g., Ridker, Strategies for Vleasuring the Cost of Air Pollution, in TH.E
ECoostnzs o- AIR POLILTION 87. 92 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966) ("How much would
you be willing to pay to obtain a more pleasant environment?"): Demsetz. The
Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. LAW & ECON. 11.25-26 (1964)
(analysis of property values and regional demand shifts). See also Sierra Club v.
Froelke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
83. The legal system is continually faced with the burden of placing monetary
values on injuries and damage which is generally not susceptible to such valuation.
For example. what is the value of a human life. loss of consortium. loss of an arm
or an eye'? Simply because valuation problems exist does not mean the loss of such
interests is not a loss. It is essential that the judicial system attempt to value such
interests.
84. In a sense, the whole legal structure of society is a mechanism for dealing %,ith
the "'costs" that individuals impose on each other. Criminal sanctions, tort lia-
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ternalization of such activities is, in fact, a basic purpose of law. If an
individual imposes a cost upon another, e.g., by tortious conduct or
breach of contract, the judicial system provides a mechanism by
which the victim is compensated by the wrongdoer. Thus, cost internalization is not a novel legal concept.
1.

The individual tort remedy

Historically, an individual whose person or property has been adversely affected by the use to which his neighbor's property has been
devoted may sue for damages or injunctive relief on the theories of
nuisance, negligence or trespass.8 5 The award of damages or the
granting of injunctive relief forces the polluter to bear the cost that his
activities have imposed on the particular plaintiff. There remain,
however, at least four inherent deficiencies in the individual tort action mode of relief.
First, the individual tort remedy is inadequate because it fails to
provide for complete assessment of the environmental problem. The
tort remedy deals with specific private property interests and seeks to
compensate only for identifiable injuries to such interests. Substantial
societal interests in environmental quality, however, are not subject to
definition in terms of private property86 and are thereby excluded
from judicial consideration in individual tort actions.8 7 Thus, substantial societal costs, e.g., excessive air and water pollution, remain unquantified and external to both the private market-pricing mechanism
and the judicial process. Cost internalization is thereby thwarted and
resource misallocation persists.

bility, and contract damages are all means of forcing one party to 'internalize'
the external costs that his actions might cause others to bear.
Cost-Internalization,supra note 77, at 384.
85. For a discussion of traditional tort remedies as alternative courses of action,
see Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to do While Waiting for Washington,
5 HARV. Civ. Ricmrs-Civ. LB. L. REv. 32, 35 (1970); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air
Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126 (1967).
86. See discussion in section 1I-A supra.
87. In many instances the sum of the private damages will not equal the total
societal costs of a particular activity. For example, pollution of Lake Champlain by International Paper in Zahn resulted in compensable damage to the private
property interests of the individual class members. There are certain costs, however,
which are not considered; e.g., the effect of pollution on fish and wildlife, the loss
of aesthetic values enjoyed by society, and the economic cost to society resulting
from the overproduction of paper. Because these substantial costs are generally over-
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Second, the tort remedy imposes substantial, often prohibitive,
"bargaining costs" upon the individual litigant. Bargaining costs are
those costs associated with resolving the conflict between the polluter
and individual pollutees.8 8 These costs include attorneys' fees, expert
witness fees, and similar fees associated with the resolution of the dispute between the parties. Where an action by a polluter affects a
group of individuals, and each must independently pursue a judicial
remedy, excessive societal bargaining costs will result from duplicative
adjudications of similar facts, rights and liabilities. The purpose of
bargaining,and the expenditures of time and money associated therewith, is, simply, to determine "whether the gain from preventing the
harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a
result of stopping the action which produces the harm."89 Thus, if individuals are forced to seek independent judicial remedies for damages sustained from pollution, for example, the judicial system will
fail to compensate for all resulting external costs if the bargaining
costs outweigh the relative benefits to be derived from litigation; the
individual will simply not sue. To the extent that victims fail to sue,
cost externalization continues and the efficient resource allocation is
diminished. Even though the damage to the individual plaintiff may
be small, the aggregate of small injuries may produce a significant societal cost. This is particularly true in environmental cases, where the
effect of pollution on individual property may be de minimus but the
total cost imposed upon society substantial110
Third, associated with the substantial bargaining costs of private
tort litigation is the risk of inconsistent adjudication of claims. Environmental planning and coordination will be severely hampered by
piecemeal litigation emanating from courts which are unable to consider the full scope of the problem. Externalities will continue because
looked, the societal cost of an activity exceeds the sum of all private damages recouped through individual tort actions.
88. Professor Coase states concerning "bargaining costs":
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is
clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon rearrangement is greater
than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about . .. In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency
with which the economic system operates.
Coase. The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcON. 1. 15-16 (1960). See also
Cost-Internalization, supra note 77, at 388.
89. Coase. supra note 88. at 27.
90. See note 87 supra.
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of incomplete consideration and inaccurate valuation of the societal
interests affected by challenged activities.
Fourth, private tort litigation, which forces consideration of external costs of production only after those costs are incurred, fails to
utilize cost internalization as a vehicle for technological assessment.9 1
This serves to frustrate the purpose of cost internalization which is to
provide full cost data to the producer so that he may view alternative
courses of action in proper economic perspective at the planning
stageY2 It is unlikely that the threat to the polluter of an occasional
damage award will either effectively deter the byproduction of pollution or induce meaningful technological assessment of potential costs and
93
benefits of an activity priorto the initiation of the activity.
Successful deterrence is predicated upon the ability of pollutees to
mount a legal threat of such financial proportion that the polluter is
forced to consider the potential economic consequences of his continued byproduction of pollution. The class action for damages provides the means to successfully mount such a threat.
2.

Class actions and environmental economics

The environmental class action is a mechanism which can effectively make the social cost of pollution a part of the cost calculation of
the polluting industry, equalize the respective bargaining positions of
polluters and pollutees in pollution cases, and reduce the costs of
reaching optimal solutions. The class action is, in addition, an impor-

91. See generally Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessient, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587 (1969).
92. Technological assessment, however, may be stimulated by several recent
judicial decisions which have interpreted subsections 102(2)(A)-(C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(A)-(C) (1970). These require
federal officials to utilize a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate proposed actions falling
within the scope of the Act and to incorporate environmental values into that analysis in conjunction with traditional economic and technical elements. See Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971). See generally Comment, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972).
93. For discussion of centralized
versus decentralized methods of
promoting cost-internalization, see Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A
Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE LJ. 647 (1971),
reviewing, G. Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsis (1970).
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tant citizen action mechanism; : 4 it provides the small stakeholder in a
large controversy not only the opportunity to promote his own individual interest, but also allows him to promote class or public interests."5
The effectiveness of the class action as a cost internalizing device
is a function of the scope of the class itself. If the scope of the class
is limited, for example, by denying a federal forum to class members
who assert claims of less than $10,000, externalities will not be internalized because of the reviewing court's inability to adequately consider the activity in full perspective.
When internalization of costs occurs by recourse to the judicial
process, the costs of prosecuting a class claim to judgment take the
form of both "bargaining" and "transaction" costs. Bargaining costs,
as previously discussed, are those costs associated with negotiating a
solution to the conflict between polluter and pollutees. : 6 Transaction
costs, peculiar to group or class litigation, are those costs incurred by
class members when dealing among themselves with respect to a
common problem. These costs may be of two kinds:" 7 (1) conference
costs that occur whenever a large group of people must arrive at
common agreement; and (2) collective-good costs, incurred (a) in
convincing aggrieved individuals of the importance of joining and
contributing to the class action, even though effort or funds on their
part may not be necessary in order to gain the benefits (e.g., cleaner
air and water), accruing from resolution of an environmental problem, and (b) in the continued environmental degradation and resource
misallocation in society due to delay in the initiation of lawsuits."'
94.

Experience has shown that administrative agencies do not always adequately

protect the public interest. Citizen lawsuits are increasingly being proposed to act as
an independent

mechanism to supplement agency action,

to monitor and check

agency and executive action, to spotlight needed areas of legislation and to insure
the inclusion and adequate consideration of all relevant factors. Lamm & Davison. Environmental
INst. 59. 61 (1971).

Class

Actions Seeking

Damages,

16 RocKY

MTN. MIN.

L.

95. Class actions have been described as - 'a way of redressing group wrongs
a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer in private practice' a cross between administrative action and private litigation.- Dolgov v. Anderson. 43 F.R.D.
472, 481 IE.D. N.Y. 1968). quoting Kalven & Rosenfield. The Contemporary Funclion of the Class Suit, 8 U. (Ou. L. Rcv. 684. 717 (1941).

96. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
97. Cost-In ternalization, supra note 77. at 403. See also Comment. The Viability
of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2 ECOL. L.Q. 533. 539-40 (1972).
98. Collective goods. such as air and water, are presently free goods. This. in effect. means that such goods carry a zero price and are subject to the collective use of
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The class mechanism should produce substantial reductions in bargaining costs, and insure only de minimus transaction costs, by consolidating all individual damage claims arising from one environmental controversy. Thus, class action adjudicaton permits relatively
distortion-free analysis of the economic consequences of pollution
byproduction. More fundamentally, and of greater importance, the
class mechanism facilitates the full exposure, in a common forum, of
economic issues surrounding an environmental controversy which
have heretofore been imperfectly addressed by the judiciary.
IV.

RAMIFICATIONS OF ZAHN:
SUMMARY

The Court in Zahn has severely limited the utility of the class action as an effective cost internalization device for environmental litigation. The decision will necessitate increased transaction and bargaining costs incident to class environmental litigation in several ways.
Narrowing the scope of the class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3)
damage suits increases the potential number of lawsuits, together with
their attendant fees and costs. The bilateral bargaining procedure
between a class representative on either side of the lawsuit will be replaced by an unmanageable and more expensive multilateral bargaining procedure. Environmental coordination and planning will be
severely impaired by piecemeal litigation emanating from courts unable to consider the full scope of the problem. Injunctive relief may
still be available by utilization of Rule 23(b)(2) but will increase the
burden on the federal judiciary. In addition, federal district courts will
now be required to conduct tedious pretrial examinations of the extent
of damages to all class members in order to determine the scope of the
class. .'9 These continuing inefficiencies will obviously deter many posociety. Air is a free good because private appropriation is impossible: the individual's
cost of controlling his bundle of rights is prohibitive. Therefore, if certain individuals
pay to improve air quality, all people in the area, whether payers or nonpayers, benefit from the improved quality of the air. Individuals will delay their own action on
an environmental problem because of the free rider effect, and they will bear an inordinate share of the costs of litigation because of other persons' free riding. As a
consequence, an insufficient number of actions are individually initiated to prevent
loss of collective goods.
99. This determination, while apparently required by Zahn, leaves open the general
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(3) which dictates that the res judicata effect is to be
determined in the subsequent action. See Advisory Comm.'s Note, supra note 24, at
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tential environmental plaintiffs from seeking legal relief in the federal
courts.
More deleterious is the effect of Zahn upon those individuals who
cannot independently establish damages in the jurisdictional amount.
Such individuals are compelled to choose a state forum or, more
likely, to abandon litigation altogether. Since polluters will not be
required to account to most of those parties unable to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement, the cost of much of America's pollution will continue to be borne principally by persons other than polluters and their customers. If pollution remains a public cost, rather
than a private cost of the polluter, widespread distortion of natural
resource allocation, as well as environmental damage in excess of the
societal optimum, will continue.
V.

A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE

The effectuation of the purposes of the private class action for
damages within the context of environmental litigation is predicated
upon the exercise of judicial power inherent in ancillary jurisdiction.
Justification for the discretionary exercise of such power is found in
the unique character of environmental problems and related diseconomies. Discretionary exercise of the court's ancillary power could proceed as follows: Once it is established that at least one of the plaintiffs
has a claim in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, all other parties
asserting claims which derive from the same, "'common nucleus of
operative fact," and supported by a showing of substantial economic
harm, could be recognized as class members. Utilizing this approach,
the court would have before it a more complete picture of the economic dynamics of the activity being scrutinized and could, thereby,
more effectively deal with the environmental controversy.
Determination of whether a given plaintiff has made a good faith
showing of "'substantial economic harm" should be left to the discretion of the trial court for those plaintiffs asserting claims of less than
$10,000. Its decision may turn on a number of considerations including the proposed size of the class, the proportion of plaintiffs individually meeting jurisdictional amount requirements to those failing to
106: RI-STAIEMNINOt
JUDGNILNTS § 86 Comment I, § 116 (1942): Note. Binding
Effect of Class Action, 67 HR%'. L. Riv. 1059. 1060(1954).
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do so, the nature of the claim alleged, the availability of alternative

modes of relief, the anticipated capability of the court to adjudicate
an action of enlarged scope, and the perceived optimal size of the action to most fully effectuate the stated purposes of the class action

mechanism.

00

Properly applied, Rule 23(b)(3) is an excellent vehicle for the effective resolution of class injuries in the environmental context. It is a
rule of convenience 1 0 ' designed to "achieve economies of time, effort
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated .... ,,102 Environmental class actions have the capacity to fulfill the stated purpose of the Rule by: (1) reducing the
bargaining cost of litigation for the individual parties; 103 (2) reducing
the transaction costs for each member of a class; 104 (3) reducing the
100. If such a proposal appears unmanageable, the reader is directed to consider
the relative manageability of the procedure contemplated by the Court in Zahn,
whereby the district court must individually determine which plaintiffs make a
"good faith showing" of $10,000 damages to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
101. See Krahmer, Some Problems of Consumer Class Actions, 7 U. RICH. L.
REV. 213, 213-16 (1972).
102. Advisory Comm.'s Note, supra note 24, at 102-03. Prof. Kaplan, reporter
for the Advisory Committee at the time of the 1966 amendments, has said:
The object [of Rule 23(b)(3)] is to get at the cases where a class action promises important advantages of economy of effort and uniformity of result without undue dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the class or the
opposing party.
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure(1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376 (1967).
103. J. MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION § 2.04(a), at 19
(1972). Further, the class mechanism has the potential to provide:
[A] n administratively workable means of combining group bargaining strength
at a minimum cost, and . . .by presenting the courts with an aggregated claim,
it encourages courts to define substantive rights to the benefit of the large group,
thereby creating a more effective bargaining force ....
Cost-Internalization,supra note 77, at 404.
104. See text accompanying note 97 supra. Conference costs can also be reduced
by class actions. If there exists no clearly defined right to be free from pollution, the
mere threat of a class action will not induce the polluter to reach a bargained solution with the class. Even if there is such a clearly defined and enforceable right, in
the absence of a class action, no mechanism exists by which the class can reach a
binding out of court agreement with the polluter:
It is only after a class suit is instituted and offers the prospect of judgment, including dismissal pursuant to judicially approved settlement, that there is
any way to bind all of the class members. Therefore, the class action serves not
only as a means of settling group claims but as a means for awarding legal authority to the class representatives. In other words, the self-, but duly, appointed
representative has the power to assert all of the class interests and thereby construct a bilateral, and manageable, "bargaining" situation from a multilateral,
unmanageable situation.
Cost-Internalization,supranote 77, at 404.
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judicial burden of assessing the societal costs of a particular activity
and of reaching optimal solutions; 05 and (4) promoting uniformity of
results by avoiding a multiplicity of suits.' 0 6 However, the Court in
Zahn, by extending the nonaggregation doctrine of Snyder v. Harris
and interpreting the "matter in controversy" clause of 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) to preclude aggregation of separate and distinct claims by
individual class members to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement, even where the named plaintiffs assert damages in excess of
$10,000, has severely and undesirably limited the effective use of
Rule 23.
James C. Carmody

105. Justice Brennan. dissenting in Zahn, stated:
It is, of course, true that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in such cases
would result in some increase in the federal courts' workload, for unless the
class action is permitted many of the claimants will be unable to obtain any
federal determination of their rights. . . . It should be sufficient answer that denial of ancillary jurisdiction will impose a much larger burden on the state and
federal judiciary as a wshole. and will substantially impair the ability of prospective class members to assert their claims.
414 U.S. at 307-08. Although utilization of a liberalized class remedy would necessarily cieate larger individual cases. the overall effect of such action would most
probably be to reduce the caseload of the federal and state judiciary as a whole.
106. Rule 23(c)(2) & (3) provide for notice to class members and require definition of the class. Res judicata will be extended to all members of the class who do
not request exclusion. The effect is to adjudicate class rights in a single proceeding
and to preclude subsequent individual proceedings based on common facts. See Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry.. 318 F. Supp. 720. 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970). offd, 441 F.2d
728 t5th Cir. 1971).
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